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R egulators Nurturing Fintech I nnovation:
Global Evolution of the R egulatory Sandbox
Opportunity-Based R egulation

as

Deirdre Ahern*

Abstract The regulatory sandbox is a real-world
alternative to regulatory lag. Its emergence as a novel regulatory
development responds to challenges faced by FinTech innovators
in navigating an unwieldy regulatory landscape not designed
with FinTech in mind. Regulatory sandboxes are in operation
in developed countries including Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Within the European Union they are seen in Denmark,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and the Netherlands. The concept
has also gained traction with regulators in developing countries
such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius and Thailand.
Not only is the regulatory sandbox an experimental space for
firms testing innovative FinTech products and services, it is also a
novel regulatory experiment for regulators. This article advances
the available literature through focusing on the contradictions
inherent in the role of the regulator in administering a
regulatory sandbox. It characterises the regulatory sandbox as
a form of agile, opportunity-based regulation, distinguished by
a regulatory approach that is concerned with actively supporting
innovators in nurturing cutting-edge innovation to benefit
innovators, consumers, investors, and the wider economy.
This is path-breaking regulatory territory. In its provision and
design, a regulatory sandbox performs a crucial signalling
function in relation to a given financial system’s receptivity to
FinTech business. An economic, pro-innovation agenda is at
work. Distinct policy questions are therefore raised regarding the
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legitimate role of public gatekeeper financial services regulators
operating regulatory sandboxes. The role of a regulatory sandbox
in nurturing and expanding competition suggests a public interest
role in the interests of consumer choice, price and efficiency
rather than simply on risk minimisation. However, pressure
on regulators to produce sandbox successes and to compete
with other sandboxes may influence the exercise of regulatory
discretion and produce regulatory distortions that affect
competition in FinTech markets.
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“The balance between allowing innovation to thrive and protecting
customers is tough to achieve but it is critical. Too much regulation
and the industry becomes sclerotic, … bogging consumers down with
antiquated systems and products. Too little, and fraud abounds. As a
concept, financial innovation does not have the best of reputations.”1

I. I ntroduction
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is an exhilarating period of experimentation. Path-breaking, disruptive innovation is radically changing the structure
of financial services markets and processes. Bricks and mortar banking and
face to face advice are being upended by disintermediated access to financial services. The advances being worked upon span a vast sphere including
money transmission, smart contracts, digital identification tools, robo-advising, distributed ledger technology (‘DLT’), big data analytics, initial coin
offerings (‘ICOs’), crowdfunding and peer to peer lending. It is axiomatic
that law often trails in the wake of societal change. This truism is exemplified by the explosion of financial technology (‘FinTech’). The speed of
FinTech adaptations has left rule-makers and regulators at sea as they seek to
1

O Ralph, ‘FCA Does Big Number to Prove it is the Font of Financial Wisdom’ Financial
Times (London, 6 April 2016) <https://www-ft-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/content/50b6fb98fb3b-11e5-b3f6-11d5706b613b> accessed 2 November 2019.
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understand the innovations that are being developed, define their mandate in
relation to such innovations, and make important policy choices with respect
to the application of regulation to these innovators as compared with more
traditional financial services. Certainly, responsive regulation is a tall order
as an expanding array of distinct and interchangeable products and services emerge under the FinTech umbrella. But it is more complex than that.
Governments fear that if their regulators do not come to the aid of FinTech
innovators to assist them to navigate the regulatory framework, entrepreneurs may be discouraged from bringing their product to market in that
jurisdiction. Thus, with FinTech, not only is the classic regulatory dilemma
between a facilitatory approach and a regulatory approach at play, but an
economic agenda is also a significant undercurrent at work. The emergence
and spread of the regulatory sandbox as a novel regulatory development
speaks to that agenda and responds constructively to the challenges faced
by FinTech innovators in navigating an unwieldy regulatory landscape not
designed with FinTech in mind. The genius of the regulatory sandbox lies
in how it provides a sheltered environment to assist FinTech innovators to
negotiate the impasse of an unclear regulatory environment while testing
the viability of their imaginative products on a scaled-down basis. This is
complex and path breaking regulatory territory that pushes regulators and
regulatory actors beyond tried and trusted roles.
Dissecting the regulatory sandbox phenomenon as a form of market intervention falling short of conventional hard regulation, this article presents
the regulatory sandbox as agile, opportunity-based regulation, characterised
by an original regulatory approach that is concerned with actively supporting innovators in nurturing cutting-edge innovation with a view to delivering benefits to innovators, consumers, investors, and ultimately the wider
economy. In its provision and design, the regulatory sandbox phenomenon
performs a crucial positioning function, broadcasting a given financial system’s receptivity to FinTech business and the perceived constructiveness of
its regulatory approach. The existence, design and differentiation of individual regulators’ sandbox offerings prompt important questions about the role
of regulators in FinTech markets. As the regulatory sandbox concept gains
traction and matures, legitimate questions need to be asked in relation to its
situation within the regulatory landscape and the role of regulators in playing midwife to selected FinTech entrepreneurs’ creations. To begin with, the
regulatory sandbox’s role in nurturing and expanding competition within
FinTech product and service markets suggests a public interest role for regulators in improving consumer choice, price and efficiency. This is a completely different driver than a regulatory model predicated on risk-reduction.
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An unavoidable question for scholars and policy-makers concerns how these
two mandates can be appropriately reconciled. 2 It is argued here that a regulator’s competition promotion agenda should not come at the expense of
appropriate consumer and investor protection.
Section II tracks the origination of the regulatory sandbox, positioning it
at the apex of regulatory supports for FinTech innovation within a financial
ecosystem, and charts its global spread. A characterisation of the regulatory
sandbox as opportunity-based regulation follows in Section III. This terrain
unpacks the role that financial services regulators are taking as promoters
of FinTech innovation within their jurisdiction and the possible implications
for competition and regulatory sentiment. Section IV considers the potential for the regulatory environment provided by the regulatory sandbox to
compromise appropriate regulation. Flowing from this, Section V presents a
hierarchy of models of regulatory relief observed in available sandboxes and
their regulatory consequences.

II. The Origination of the R egulatory Sandbox
P henomenon
Financial regulation is typically concerned with risks to the public interest including market conduct and consumer protection, market integrity,
soundness of financial institutions and financial stability. Classically, financial services regulators are concerned with two ends of a ruler – devising and
enforcing rules with a focus on risk-based regulation. However, command
and control regulatory behaviour is less fashionable as regulators become
more dynamic; responsive regulation is flexible.3 Challenges for financial
market regulation and legal controls have been heightened by technological
advances such as the advent of algorithmic trading, predictive advisory services, automated credit scoring applications and Digital IDs, to name but a

2

3

On this, see, E Avgouleas, ‘Regulating Financial Innovation’ in N Moloney, E Ferran and
J Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015); C Brummer
and Y Yadev, ‘Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma’ (2019) 107 Georgetown Law Journal
235 (exploring the difficulty of regulators successfully encouraging financial innovation
while also achieving rules simplicity and market integrity); Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘The disruptive
implications of fintech - policy themes for financial regulators’ (2017) 21(1) Journal of
Technology Law & Policy.
On responsive regulation, see generally, R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Really Responsive
Regulation’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59; J Braithwaite, ‘The Essence of Responsive
Regulation’ (2010) 44 UBC Law Review 475. For a good discussion in a technology context, see, M Fenwick, Wulf Kaal and EP Vermeulen, ‘Regulation tomorrow: what happens
when technology is faster than the law’ (2016) 6 American University Business Law Review
561.
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few. As Brummer observes, “regulatory and market disruptions overlap”.4
Many regulators believe in the wisdom of standing back and adopting a
‘wait and see’ approach, watching these innovations manifest while probing their costs and benefits. In the European Union (‘the EU’), rather than
rushing to regulate in the FinTech space, the EU institutions have undertaken careful information-gathering and monitoring of business and regulatory developments at the national level.5 Other regulators may be tempted
to apply the full rigour of rules not designed for FinTech even where the fit
is not good, with the result that beneficial innovation meets with unsuitable
regulatory barriers and as such, may risk being stifled prematurely. This
could occur, for example, when the full rigour of capital adequacy rules
designed for banks are applied to crowdlending operations, making market
entry difficult. At the other end of the regulatory continuum lie concerns that
amid competition to carve up the FinTech pie, some regulators are opting for
a race to the bottom in a bid to attract start-ups and investors.
Globally, we are some way off fashioning a suitable regulatory path to
meet the brave new world that FinTech brings. Thus far, much of the extant
international policy discussion concerning FinTech remains preliminary and
generic – descriptive and largely confined to mapping developments, while
extolling the virtues of continuing regulatory debate and dialogue. Progress
is slow and no match for the speed of technological invention.6 In the regula4

5

6

C Brummer, ‘Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation’ (2015) 84 Fordham Law
Review 977, 980.
See further, European Commission, FinTech Action Plan: For a More Competitive and
Innovative European Financial Sector (COM(2018) 109/2) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/
sites/info/files/180308-action-plan-fintech_en.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
Scholars are beginning to tackle thorny questions of regulatory approach for FinTech.
See, for example, Brummer (n 4); Fenwick, Kaal and Vermeulen (n 3); E Biber and others, ‘Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb’
(2017) 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 1561; DW Arner, JN Barberis and RP Buckley, ‘FinTech,
RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 3 Northwestern
Journal of International Law and Business 371; W Magnusson, ‘Regulating FinTech’
(2018) 71 Vanderbilt Law Review 1167; D Ahern, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage in a FinTech
World: Devising an Optimal EU Regulatory Response to Crowdlending’ (2018) 3 Journal
of Business Law 193; J Armour and L Enriques, ‘The Promise and Perils of Crowdfunding:
Between Corporate Finance and Consumer Contracts’ (2018) Modern Law Review 51; J
Armour and L Enriques, ‘Individual Investors’ Access to Crowdinvesting: Two Regulatory
Models’ in D Cumming and L Hornuf (eds), The Economics of Crowdfunding (Palgrave
2018); Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Pathways to European Policy and Regulation in the Crypto-economy’
(2019) 10 European Journal of Risk Regulation 738; RH Weber and R Baisch, ‘FinTech –
Eligible Safeguards to Foster the Regulatory Framework’ (2018) 33 Journal of International
Banking Law & Regulation 335; V Burilov, ‘Regulation of Crypto Tokens and Initial Coin
Offerings in the EU’ (2019) 6 European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 146;
M Lehmann, ‘Global Rules for a Global Market Place? – The Regulation and Supervision
of Fintech Providers’ (2019) European Banking Institute Working Paper No. 45 <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421963> accessed 2 November 2019.
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tory vacuum, the distinctive fluidity of the regulatory sandbox phenomenon
is born of regulatory adaptability to the complexity of FinTech. Not surprisingly, in working towards formulating appropriate regulatory approaches
to FinTech, a stakeholder-based approach has assumed prominence internationally. This is a space for reflexive governance, fitting within the core
of decentred regulation, involving both state and non-state actors operating
within a responsive regulatory agenda.7
While regulatory solutions for FinTech prove elusive, what is not in doubt
is the economic promise of FinTech.8 An ill-fitting regulatory framework of
uncertain application to FinTech applications causes frustration when juxtaposed alongside FinTech’s potential, not just for consumers, but also the
wider economic benefits for countries where FinTech is nurtured and scaling
up is facilitated.9 Thus, in the regulatory vacuum, governments and regulators are acutely aware of the importance of providing an ecosystem of spaces
that will support financial technology – incubators, accelerator hubs and
innovation hubs as well as regulatory sandboxes.10 While incubators generally involve mentoring and hothousing, accelerator hubs11 provide physical
space for experimentation and collaboration. Innovation facilitators, often
styled as innovation hubs or labs, are generally designed to provide engagement, support and advice on how to negotiate the regulatory framework.
Innovation hubs thus provide informal points of contact with regulators
which, at an early stage, proves both less intimidating and more convenient
for start-ups and small firms than more formal contacts with regulators.
Queries generally addressed by hubs include issues in relation to whether
authorisation is needed, how regulatory and supervisory requirements
may be applied in practice, anti-money laundering regime issues and the
7

8

9

10

11

For a good discussion of this style of approach to regulation, see, A Wardrop, ‘Co-Regulation,
Responsive Regulation and the Reform of Australia’s Retail Electronic Payment Systems’
(2014) 30 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 197; Fenwick, Kaal and Vermeulen (n 3).
The global FinTech market is projected to reach US $124.3 billion by 2025. See, ‘Global
FinTech Market Report’ (QYResearch, 21 February 2020) <https://www.qyresearch.com/
index/detail/1527695/global-fintech-market> accessed 4 March 2020.
This of course also depends on the availability of access to venture capital in a given financial system. See, M Arnold, ‘UK Fintech Sector in Buoyant Mood as Valuations Soar’
Financial Times (London, 27 September 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/3bcad1beb1d7-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c> accessed 2 November 2019 (reflecting on the effects of
open banking in the UK).
Terms such as ‘innovation hub’ and ‘accelerator’ have not assumed a unified understanding
or become a recognised term of art and are being used interchangeably with a variety of
other terms such as ‘innovation lab’ and ‘FinTech lab’. On this taxonomical dissonance,
see, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices: Implications of Fintech
Developments for Banks and Bank Supervisors (Bank for International Settlements, 2018)
39 <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d431.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
The term ‘hub’ is often added to refer to the provision of a co-working space.

2019 THE REGULATORY SANDBOX AS OPPORTUNITY-BASED REGULATION 351

applicability of consumer protection measures.12 First, benefits flow to the
innovator. Vitally, this informal contact allows non-regulated entities to
informally engage with FinTech regulators concerning the regulatory perimeter.13 This may also help to map the need to engage with other regulators
and supervisors concerning the regulatory perimeter on issues such as data
privacy. Second, and equally crucially, the benefits flowing are two way –
regulators who facilitate such contact and informal support gain enormously
from the associated ability to keep abreast of and understand FinTech trends
in market innovation. This enables the lessening of a regulator’s regulatory blind spot in relation to what is happening outside those firms that are
authorised and within its direct regulatory line of sight. These discussions
are thus hugely beneficial to regulators and help to ensure that regulatory
policy discussions, risk-assessment and decision-making are based on a solid
knowledge foundation. In short, innovation supports provide an invaluable
and costless mutual learning opportunity.
Building on the mindset of these initiatives to encourage FinTech, the
unique hybrid business advisory and regulatory initiative known as the regulatory sandbox germinated. A regulatory sandbox gives permission to try
and fail, and to do so in a controlled fashion that is less costly than would
be the case on the open market as well as without systemic risk implications.
The trailblazing concept originated in the United Kingdom (‘the UK’) and
helped to establish the global reputation of the Financial Conduct Authority
(‘the FCA’) as a regulatory leader. The history of the regulatory sandbox can
be traced back to a deceptively simple act of reasoning by analogy. In 2015,
Sir Mark Walport, then Britain’s chief scientific adviser, floated the idea that
the financial services sector could benefit from having the equivalent of clinical trials available to the pharmaceutical industry.14 This appealed to the

12

13

14

European Supervisory Authorities, FinTech: Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation
Hubs (JC 2018 74, 2019) para 28 <https://esas-joint-committee.europa.eu/Publications/
Press%20Releases/JC%202018%2074%20Joint%20Report%20on%20Regulatory%20
Sandboxes%20and%20Innovation%20Hubs.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019. Queries on
issues such as data protection and cybersecurity usually fall within the mandate of other
sectoral regulators.
There is a credible argument that a regulatory sandbox should be a bolt-on to an effective
innovation hub rather than operating on a stand-alone basis. On this, see, RP Buckley
and others, ‘Building FinTech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and
Beyond’ (2019) European Banking Institute Working Paper No. 53 <https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455872> accessed 2 November 2019.
United Kingdom Government Chief Scientific Adviser, FinTech Futures: The UK as a
World Leader in Financial Technologies (Government Office for Science, 2015) 10-11,
52 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413095/gs-15-3-fintech-futures.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
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Project Innovate division of the FCA15 and the FCA’s regulatory sandbox
regime for FinTech was unveiled a year later in 2016. The FCA’s prototype
aimed “to promote more effective competition in the interests of consumers
by allowing firms to test innovative products, services and business models
in a live market environment, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards
are in place.”16 Firms applying to the FCA sandbox apply on a cohort basis
(there are two six-month test periods each year). Applicants must set out
in their application how they meet the eligibility criteria for testing. This
requires having a financial services business in the UK which is ‘genuinely
innovative’ and meets an ‘identifiable consumer benefit’.17 Applicants must
also show a demonstrable need and readiness for sandbox testing.18 The
FCA’s dedicated sandbox unit assesses regulatory sandbox applications19
and decides which, if any, of the applicable regulations can be relaxed in
any given case. This allows an agile, tailored approach to be taken which
adapts to the needs of individual FinTech companies while also ensuring
that appropriate consumer protection is in place. Controlled roll-out to consumers within a regulatory sandbox allows modifications to be made to the
business model to respond to consumer and regulatory feedback. The FCA
regards the sandbox as having been effective in helping firms to understand
and potentially accelerate their route to market, and reduce costs on external regulatory consultants. 20 The FCA also concludes that the sandbox has
successfully allowed it to identify and control risks. 21
The economic imperative of realising FinTech’s potential, coupled with
the difficulty of navigating regulatory landscape, has played a part in rapidly
propelling the success of the regulatory sandbox solution beyond national
borders. Following in the footsteps of the UK, regulatory sandboxes have
emerged in financial centres across the globe. 22 Regulatory sandboxes are
in operation in developed countries including Australia, Brunei, Canada,
15

16

17
18
19

20
21
22

Project Innovate began in 2014 with the aim of providing innovative firms with support to
navigate the regulatory system and of promoting competition to benefit consumers.
Financial Conduct Authority, Regulatory Sandbox Lessons Learned Report (2017)
para
2.1
<www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-learned-report.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
ibid 4.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) 4.
Distributed ledger technology was the most common type of technology being utilised in
the first two cohorts of firms in the FCA sandbox.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) para 2.8.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16).
DA Zetzsche and others, ‘Regulating a Revolution from Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart
Regulation’ (2017) 23 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 31; M Weschler,
L Perlman and N Gurung, ‘The State of Regulatory Sandboxes in Developing Countries’
(2018) Columbia Digital Financial Services Observatory Working Paper <https://dfsobservatory.com/sites/default/files/DFSO%20-%20The%20State%20of%20Regulatory%20
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Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United
Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) and the United States (in the States of Arizona,
Kentucky, Utah and Wyoming). Within the EU, they are seen in Denmark,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and the Netherlands. Meanwhile, Austria,
Estonia, Italy and Spain have committed to launching a regulatory sandbox. The EU is presently contemplating whether it should intervene to ensure
some uniformity of approach. 23 Sandboxes are of most relevance in jurisdictions where there are reasonably developed authorisation regimes for financial services, and particularly, FinTech. While the regulatory sandbox has
gathered most headway in developed and emerging economies, it also reveals
potential in developing countries. For example, regulatory sandboxes are in
evidence in Bahrain, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Thailand.24 Some developing countries such as the Philippines have deployed a ‘test and learn’ model
that bears similarities to the sandbox concept. The main differential is that
a regulatory sandbox is generally subject to a more formalised process with
standard application and assessment criteria. 25 In other emerging and developing economies such as Kenya, Mexico and Sri Lanka, regulatory sandboxes remain under active policy consideration. In the context of developing
countries, a regulatory sandbox has obvious potential to facilitate FinTech
solutions that assist with a financial inclusion objective within the relevant
financial ecosystem. 26 That said, developing countries can present unique
challenges for FinTech innovation in terms of market, resources, infrastructure, distance from innovation hubs and other supports. 27
Among the developing countries, India has made an active effort to improve
its receptivity to FinTech innovation. A regulatory sandbox framework was

23

24
25
26

27

Sandboxes%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20-%20PUBLIC.pdf>
accessed
2
November 2019; Buckley and others (n 13).
European Supervisory Authorities (n 12); European Commission, Final report of the
Expert Group on Regulatory Obstacles to Financial Innovation (2018) 70 <https://
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/191113-report-expert-group-regulatory-obstacles-financial-innovation_en.pdf>
accessed 2 November 2019.
Weschler, Perlman and Gurung (n 22).
Weschler, Perlman and Gurung (n 22) para 2.2, Exhibit 1.
On financial inclusion, see, I Jenik and K Lauer, ‘Regulatory Sandboxes and Financial
Inclusion’ (2017) Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Working Paper <www.cgap.
org/sites/default/files/researches/documents/ Working-Paper-Regulatory-SandboxesOct-2017.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019; T Aveni and I Jenik, ‘Crowdfunding in China:
the Financial Inclusion Dimension’ (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, July 2017)
<www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/researches/documents/Brief-Crowdfunding-in-ChinaJul-2017_0.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
Weschler, Perlman and Gurung (n 22) para 4.2.3.
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finalised by the Reserve Bank of India (‘the RBI’) in 2019. 28 In 2016, the
RBI established an inter-regulator working group to examine the regulatory landscape for enabling the delivery of low-cost financial products and
services in the context of the FinTech evolution. Its observations floodlit the
importance of establishing a regulatory sandbox for FinTech. The origination of the RBI’s sandbox proposal can be traced to the 2017 Household
Finance Report29 where the creation of a regulatory sandbox was proposed
that would allow small-scale testing and temporary waivers of certain regulations in a carefully controlled environment.30 The subsequent deliberations
of the Working Group on FinTech and Digital Banking31 led in turn to the
publication of a Draft Framework in April 2019 for public consultation and
of the ‘Enabling Framework for Regulatory Sandbox’ in August 2019. 32 The
potential to improve retailer and consumer access to banking and payments
mechanisms and other financial services in India was well-captured in the
following terms:
The [regulatory sandbox] can go a long way in not only improving
the pace of innovation and technology absorption but also in financial
inclusion and in improving financial reach [such as through enabling]
microfinance, innovative small savings and micro-insurance products,
remittances, mobile banking and other digital payments.33

28

29

30

31

32

33

The final framework was released in August 2019: see, Reserve Bank of India
(Department of Banking Regulation, Banking Policy Division), Enabling Framework for
Regulatory Sandbox (2019) <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs//PublicationReport/Pdfs/
ENABLING79D8EBD31FED47A0BE21158C337123BF.PDF> accessed 2 November
2019.
Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Household Finance Committee on Indian Household
Finance (2017) para 7 <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/
HFCRA28D0415E2144A009112DD314ECF5C07.PDF> accessed 2 November 2019.
ibid para 7. This would enable the collection of “empirical evidence which can ultimately
lead to better policy solutions, whilst simultaneously evaluating the risk of any new product or technology.”
Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Working Group on FinTech and Digital Banking
(2018) <https://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?ID=892#4> accessed 2
November 2019.
Reserve Bank of India (Department of Banking Regulation, Banking Policy Division),
Draft Enabling Framework for Regulatory Sandbox (2019) <https://rbi.org.in/scripts/
PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=920> accessed 2 November 2019;
Reserve Bank of India, ‘RBI releases draft Enabling Framework for Regulatory Sandbox’
(Press Release, 2019) <https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=46843> accessed 2 November 2019. The RBI indicated that feedback was received
from 69 stakeholders, including FinTech firms, banks, multilateral agencies, industry
associations, payment aggregators, audit and legal firms, government departments and
individuals.
Reserve Bank of India (n 28) para 3.3.
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The RBI regulatory sandbox framework for FinTech companies includes
an indicative list of innovative products and technologies which may be
eligible, 34 and also indicates what is ineligible including cryptocurrencies,
ICOs and credit registries. The framework is designed to be open to entities
including banks and financial institutions for products that are ready for
testing, meet a gap in the financial ecosystem and have clear benefits for
consumers or the FinTech industry. The RBI framework also sets out a series
of conditions to be met including minimum net worth requirements, fit and
proper criteria for directors and promoters, satisfactory credit score, robust
IT infrastructure and adequate managerial resources. Notably, insurance
cover is a requirement for participation. 35 The RBI’s sandbox will operate
on the basis of a series of thematic cohorts such as financial inclusion, payments and lending, and digital know your customer (‘KYC’). The application process for the first themed sandbox on digital retail payments products
opened in late 2019 with a view to testing commencing in 2020. 36 This will
enable FinTech innovation in the sphere of digital payments, digital KYC
and wealth management. This is in line the RBI’s drive to facilitate FinTech
innovation, improve financial inclusion and move India towards a cashless
economy. The Indian example illustrates the significant potential for FinTech
to provide digital payment solutions in developing countries where access to
brick and mortar financial institutions is a challenge.

III. Opportunity-Based R egulation and R egulators
P romoters of Competition in FinTech M arkets

as

The regulatory sandbox effectively showcases how regulators themselves
have proved agile and inventive in recognising and working around the deadening effect of regulatory lag.37 The regulatory sandbox also represents a
‘reasonable compromise’38 where rushing to regulate may be a mistake.

34

35
36

37

38

Mobile technology applications, data analytics, application program interface (API) services, blockchain technology applications, artificial intelligence and machine learning
applications are listed. See, Reserve Bank of India (n 28) paras 6.1.1-6.1.2.
Reserve Bank of India (n 28) para 6.8.3.
No maximum number of participants has been set for each cohort. Participation will be for
a maximum of 27 weeks.
On agile governance, see, World Economic Forum, ‘Agile Governance: Reimagining
Policy-making in the Fourth Industrial Revolution’ (2018) <http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_Agile_Governance_Reimagining_Policy-making_4IR_report.pdf> accessed 2
November 2019.
WG Ringe and C Ruof, ‘A Regulatory Sandbox for Robo Advice’ (2018) European Banking
Institute Working Paper No. 26, 52 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3188828> accessed 2 November 2019.
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Within the framework of FinTech innovation supports, the regulatory
sandbox lies at the apex in terms of its characteristic regulatory interface
because it moves beyond being purely an advisory conduit associated with
other supports such as innovation hubs. Although regulatory sandboxes
for FinTech differ across jurisdictions in terms of entry requirements and
nature of the environment, a shared characteristic is that firms admitted to
the sandbox are restricted in relation to the nature and scale of the activities
they may carry out during testing in the sandbox environment. Monitoring
of testing is a more resource-intensive activity for regulators than the general
compliance monitoring they typically undertake, given the innovative nature
of the FinTech products being tested and the likelihood of unknowable risks,
all the while navigating a regulatory framework not designed with the product in mind. This explains the importance of managing a contained roll-out
within the test bed. A scaled-down test reduces the total risk and may be
designed to concentrate the risk on consumers considered best equipped to
handle such risk. As far as sandbox users are concerned, contained roll-out
provides invaluable early-stage feedback allowing product modifications and
tweaks to the business model. Provision of advice by regulators on regulatory compliance assists with product roll-out and increases the chance of
being able to harness the opportunity successfully. In short, the sandbox is
of benefit in terms of saving time and financial resources as well as easing the
regulatory journey of a user. If viability is thrown into doubt, the associated
expense for failure will be far less in a sandbox launch to a small client base
followed by a managed exit than would be the case with a full-scale launch
on the open market.
Incontestably, the adoption of a regulatory sandbox qualifies, on its face,
as a pro-innovation regulatory stance – an adaptive regulatory move away
from Baldwin and Black’s dialectic of risk-based regulation or problem-based
regulation39 to a new type of regulation which this article terms ‘opportunity-based regulation’. Within the lens of opportunity-based regulation,
financial services regulators play a critical part in actively nurturing and
promoting competition in emerging and nascent FinTech markets, in addition to operating in the traditional regulatory space. Quintessentially, the
sandbox concept comprises a realpolitik alternative to regulators sitting on
their hands while maintaining a passive ‘wait and see’ stance to regulatory
lag.40 Through the prism of a regulatory sandbox, opportunity-based regula39

40

R Baldwin and J Black, ‘Driving Priorities in Risk-Based Regulation: What’s the Problem?’
(2016) 43(4) Journal of Law and Society 565.
For a discussion of a ‘wait and see’ approach as a justifiable regulatory strategy in the context of crowdfunding, see, Armour and Enriques (n 6). In the context of crowdlending, see,
Ahern (n 6).
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tion provides a ‘third way’ featuring a more active stance involving support,
mutual dialogue and learning in order to realise the potential of FinTech
innovation.41 This is regulatory agility at its peak. The regulatory sandbox
concept actively supports cutting-edge innovation with a view to delivering
opportunities for innovators, but also benefits for consumers, investors, and
ultimately the wider economy. The active support and mentoring provided
within the sandbox environment marks out opportunity-based regulation
in this context as travelling quite some distance beyond mere facilitative
regulation.
Opportunity-based regulation for sandbox participants is responsive and
dialogic, but also time-limited. This serves to dynamically propel FinTech
innovation to market in spite of the unwieldiness of a regulatory framework
not made with these business models in mind. This agenda is consistent with
Ringe and Ruof’s contention that “[g]ood regulation … should not only
focus on addressing potential risks, but should also strive to identify market developments that are desirable for the system, and moreover promote
those.”42
In big picture terms, it is entirely legitimate to regard the regulatory
sandbox as part proxy for governmental desire to boost the economy by
attracting and enabling FinTech innovation. This forces the consideration
of competition promotion as part of the regulatory agenda of the regulatory
sandbox. Internationally, there is a bifurcation between countries adopting
the dual mandate model, whereby regulators are charged with encouraging
business innovation as well as having a traditional regulatory role, and those
where market development is hived off to specialist trade bodies. The UK’s
FCA provides the quintessential example of the formal dual mandate model,
having the role of promoting effective competition in regulated financial services in the interests of consumers as well as of performing traditional regulatory functions. The Financial Services Act 2012 acknowledges a triptych
of consumer protection, market integrity and competition objectives.43 The
FCA’s effective competition mandate is further elucidated by the statutory
specification that regard may be had by the FCA to considerations such as
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In the United States, there is a history of the Securities and Exchange Commission using
pilot schemes to trial regulation. On this, see, Brummer (n 4) 1046-1047.
Ringe and Ruof (n 38) 7.
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 1B(3) (as substituted by s 6 of the Financial
Services Act 2012). On the background to the competition promotion mandate, see,
Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations (2011) paras
8.75-8.87 <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120827143059/http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/> accessed 2 November 2019.
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ease of market entry and encouragement of innovation.44 That said, even
where a competition promotion role is not formally assigned to a regulatory
agency in establishment legislation, a pro-FinTech agenda may nonetheless
arise on a de facto basis based on the adaptive manner in which a regulatory agency exercises its operational powers. This has particular resonance
in relation to the operational application of regulatory sandbox models by
regulators in practice.
Why does this matter? A role in promoting innovation and effective
competition in financial services assigned to a sectoral regulator is clearly
distinct from the role of competition law, more generally, in preventing
abusive behaviour which distorts the market. Nonetheless, arguments can
be summoned against a quasi-market-making role being assigned to regulators. Most obviously, the argument can be advanced that in the case of
the regulatory sandbox, regulators are artificially interfering with natural
selection in the market. The operation of a regulatory sandbox regime has
direct and indirect impacts on the structure of competition and shapes market responses of both incumbents and potential entrants to FinTech markets.
Both the existence of a regulatory sandbox regime and its design features
matter and have effects on the choices and behaviour of regulatory actors.
The contours of the regulatory perimeter of a regulatory sandbox have an
impact on how FinTech actors, particularly start-ups, plan and execute their
route to market. Buckley et al contend that any ‘copy-cat sandbox’ based on
the FCA model does not send such a strong pro-innovation signal as the original.45 However, as the regulatory sandbox proliferates globally, many other
regulators are carving out their own identity through innovating in their
own right on sandbox characteristics, for instance, by providing a guaranteed time to a decision on applications, and in Singapore and India, through
the provision of a dedicated Insurtech sandbox.
The regulatory sandbox is unique in terms of the manner in which the regulator is making ex ante business judgments on the commerciality of what
is proposed and is placing itself in the position of an arbiter on innovation.
Representing the heart of what the regulatory sandbox is about, innovation
is understandably the overriding entry threshold. However, the strictures of
how that is understood vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Under the UK
FCA model, the overriding criterion for admission to the sandbox is essentially that what is proposed to be tested must involve bringing sufficiently
new or ground-breaking innovation to the market that makes a real addition
44
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Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 1E(2) (as substituted by s 6 of the Financial
Services Act 2012).
Buckley and others (n 13) 17-18.
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to the available consumer offering.46 This innovation threshold has gone on
to become a fairly universal requirement in other jurisdictions inspired by
the UK’s initiative.47 This generally requires demonstration that the financial
services product or service is genuinely innovative and benefits consumers
by either meeting an untapped need or serving an existing need better than
current market players. A well-measured approach is seen in the definition
of ‘innovation’ in Arizona, a state which has led the way in the United States
in terms of being the first to provide a framework for FinTech. Innovation is
defined as:
the use or incorporation of new or emerging technology or the re-imagination of uses for existing technology to address a problem, provide a benefit or otherwise offer a product, service, business model
or delivery mechanism that is not known by the Attorney General to
have a comparable widespread offering in this state.48

The knock-on effects of threshold determinations on innovativeness are
considerable given the practical and goodwill advantages that accompany
the cachet of selection for a given sandbox. This points up the prospect of
regulators as deciders of what qualifies as innovative, rather than as simply
interpreters and enforcers of rules. This is a major role shift.
In judging novelty, given the rapidly emerging nature of the FinTech industry, there are likely to be amplified knowledge and information gaps relevant
on the part of the FinTech regulator.49 Regulatory personnel assessing sandbox applications are likely doing their very best to be on top of FinTech in
terms of both business models and technological innovation, yet they may be
heavily reliant on observation-based learning, often from regulatory actors
with whom they are engaged in regulatory dialogue, rather than having the
benefit of direct experiential learning. The challenge of threshold decisions
on admission to the sandbox being made on the basis of imperfect information is particularly acute in emerging markets with innovative new products.
Information asymmetries are likely to be greater again for sandbox regulators who prioritise guaranteed expedited decision-making as a feature of the
46

47

48
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Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Applying to the regulatory sandbox’ (2017) <https://www.
fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/prepare-application> accessed 2 November 2019.
See, for example, Monetary Authority of Singapore, FinTech Regulatory Sandbox
Guidelines (2016) paras 6.2(a), 6.2(b) and 7.4 <www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/Smart%20
Financial%20Centre/Sandbox/FinTech%20Regulatory%20Sandbox%20Guidelines%20
19Feb2018.pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
Arizona Revised Statutes 2018, § 41-5601, para 4 <https://law.justia.com/codes/arizona/2018/title-41/section-41-5601> accessed 2 November 2019.
F Scott Morton, ‘Are a Competition Authority and an Industry Regulator Equivalent?’
(2015) 14 Colorado Technology Law Journal 9, 13.
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sandbox offering, thus making decisions based on a truncated assessment
process.
The assessment of innovation as the touchstone entry criterion for admission to regulatory sandboxes means that regulator determinations indirectly influence market viability propositions and thus, market outcomes.
Accordingly, whether or not a competition promotion role is formally
assigned to a relevant regulator administering a FinTech sandbox, assessment invariably requires financial services regulators to gauge and compare
applications based on existing competition, product comparators and substitutability and potential market demand.50 Anna Wallace, Head of Innovate
at the UK’s FCA has reflected on the contribution of regulators to determining market innovation as follows:
As regulators we’re under constant pressure to be more ‘pro-innovative’. [A regulatory sandbox allows you] to do that in a way that gives
you comfort that you’re creating an environment that you control.
Up until now regulators have never had the power to do that — the
regulators have either decided whether something is outside or inside
regulation. The regulatory sandbox provides a third way, where you
can allow it in a small way into regulation, so you can observe what
the risks and issues of that business model are. You control that environment before allowing it into the market. 51

In terms of market outcomes, opportunity-based regulation is selectively
applied – there are winners and losers. The competitive selection process for
the sandbox creates a small in-group cohort of participants52 and a larger
out-group of non-participants. The sandbox gives those admitted a considerable competitive advantage compared to their peers in terms of testing,
negotiating route to market and navigating regulatory compliance. Sandbox
participation can help to reduce initial regulatory uncertainty, thereby enabling greater focus by participants on crystallising the technical performance
of the innovative product or service and its business model. Sandboxes participants benefit from cost-free compliance advice, potential regulatory
50

51
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On the question of whether sectoral regulators are appropriately equipped to define markets
and engage in market analysis, see, MM Dabbah, ‘The Relationship Between Competition
Authorities and Sectoral Regulators’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 113, 128.
J Kelly, ‘Arizona Sandbox Gives Start-Ups a Regulatory Path to US’ Financial Times
(London, 12 November 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/aac62a22-c196-11e8-84cd9e601db069b8> accessed 2 November 2019.
Responding to criticism of an earlier proposal to limit participation to 10-12 entities at
once, the Reserve Bank of India’s final framework for its regulatory sandbox released in
August 2019 (n 28) did not limit the number of entities that could be admitted to the sandbox at once.
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waivers, and the goodwill value of a level of official endorsement which is
marketable to financiers and potential clients. The type of tools and support provided by regulators vary but advice on regulatory compliance that
assists with product roll-out is standard. Thus, special treatment afforded to
sandbox participants dissolves the level playing field for market entry, and
participation in the sandbox potentially reduces both the barriers to and the
costs of market entry significantly.
A sandbox regime based on selective admission and centred around innovation differs fundamentally from an authorisation regime that is potentially
open to all. The riposte to this is that the trade-off of the sandbox’s selectivity is a stopgap measure to address regulatory complexity and that individual nurturing in small cohorts helps some FinTech innovators succeed who
otherwise would not. Nonetheless, in the rush to facilitate FinTech innovation, countries need to be conscious of fairness in designing, integrating
and applying a regulatory sandbox within a financial system. Equality of
access is a consideration. The RBI’s Working Group on FinTech and Digital
Banking highlighted the regulatory pitfall of choosing “to unduly favour
newcomers by regulating them less stringently than incumbents, in the
name of fostering competition.”53 Reflecting that objection, not every jurisdiction has thrown its hat in the regulatory sandbox ring, and for some regulators, this is a conscious decision based on principled objection rather than
a passive regulatory stance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some sectoral
regulators, including those in France, Germany and Ireland remain cautious
and sceptical about the role of regulatory sandboxes and their part in driving competition outcomes in this post-financial crisis era. The preference
of these regulators is to confine themselves to a more general advisory role,
often in the form of a FinTech regulatory advisory desk open to all.
A further consideration concerns the manner in which the traditional
role of the regulator is rewritten in the context of the regulatory sandbox.
Provision of a regulatory sandbox sees a regulator moving from the role of
gatekeeper to quasi-compliance consultant and ally. Valuable product advice
is dispensed. For example, in the UK, the FCA provides secondary review of
robo-advice by a qualified financial advisor.54 Relatedly, there is an inherent
53
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Reserve Bank of India (n 31). However, that objection did not permeate the subsequent
Draft Enabling Framework for Regulatory Sandbox: Reserve Bank of India (n 32). See
also, United States Department of the Treasury, A Financial System that Creates Economic
Opportunities: Nonbank Financials, Fintech and Innovation (2018) 171 <https://home.
treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf> accessed 2 November 2019.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) para 2.6. For an exploration of the potential of a dedicated regulatory sandbox for robo-advice, see, Ringe and Ruof (n 38). On regulation of
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risk of herding behaviour by both investors and retail customers based on
a positive bias surrounding mere selection for admission to testing in the
regulatory sandbox. Rightly or wrongly, a firm’s admission to a regulatory
sandbox and the associated regulatory oversight has prestige value and can
lead to a public perception of increased regulatory certainty. Although in
actuality a preliminary testing phase, admission to the sandbox is frequently
perceived on the ground and in the media as providing a coveted regulatory
stamp of approval and de facto endorsement of the underlying product or
service, which helps to attract customers and venture capital.55 In the UK,
the FCA specifically flags as a success indicator that testing in the regulatory sandbox has been instrumental in helping firms access finance. 56 Indeed,
reflecting this, anecdotal evidence suggests that some firms primarily use the
sandbox process not for product testing, but rather to obtain free compliance
advice or alternatively, as a means to attract the interest of venture capitalists
so that they can pivot and scale up. To conclude, both direct and indirect
competitive impacts accrue from regulatory sandbox participation.
Turning to the regulator’s perspective, there is pressure on regulators
administering sandboxes to produce tangible results and for regulators to
compare their respective outcomes. Pressure on regulators to produce sandbox successes may influence the exercise of regulatory discretion and produce regulatory distortions. Particularly in cases where a tailored regulatory
environment is created, an element of regulatory capture may be at play
given the desire of regulators to see successful testing and market entry of
sandbox participants. For the FCA sandbox, the first cohort of 24 accepted
firms was announced in late 2016.57 75 percent of firms in the first cohort
successfully completed testing with 90 percent of these proceeding towards
a wider market launch.58 On the back of these figures, the FCA sandbox is
regarded as top of the leader board by competition promotion standards.
However, in many other jurisdictions, sandbox outcomes have been far more
muted.59 In some cases, a less than expected initial take-up of the regulatory
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robo-advice, see, Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Transforming the Financial Advice Market - The Roles of
Robo-advice, Financial Regulation and Public Governance in the UK’ (2019) Banking and
Finance Law Review (forthcoming).
J Kelly, ‘A ‘Fintech Sandbox’ might sound like a Harmless Idea. It’s Not’ Financial Times
(London, 5 December 2018) <https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/05/1543986004000/A-fintech-sandbox--might-sound-like-a-harmless-idea--It-s-not/> accessed 2 November
2019.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) paras 1.1, 2.10-2.12.
A further four cohorts were accepted based on competitive applications in 2017, 2018 and
2019.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) para 2.9.
For example, in Australia, as of May 2019, there was only one current user and six past users
of the regulatory sandbox licence exemption: See, Australian Securities and Investments
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sandbox offering is likely to be due in part to inherent restrictions within the
national design of a particular sandbox.60 Public discussion around bottom
line results underscores how conscious FinTech regulators are about calibrating their sandboxes to signal their attractiveness to the FinTech market. As a
consequence, some regulators have been coy in relation to fully transparent
disclosure of outcomes.
This brings the discussion to the competition between jurisdictions
(and thus, sandbox regulators) for FinTech business. A regulatory sandbox
needs to be contextualised as but one element of a regulatory environment.
However, all else being equal, each regulator competes with substitute sandbox regimes to attract the market for sandboxes: start-ups and other innovators across the FinTech spectrum. In an open market, prices perform an
economic signalling role in relation to the state of supply and demand. The
regulatory sandbox performs a similar function, providing an indicator that
a regulator offering the regulatory sandbox as a lifeline to FinTech actors
is pro-innovation or ‘FinTech-friendly’. Innovation is the overriding entry
threshold and this, combined with favourable regulatory treatment and support provides the foundation of the signalling function. The signal emitted
is nuanced, going beyond the black or white of the existence of a sandbox
offering or its absence. Signalling comes not only from the primary signal
provided by the availability of the sandbox, but also from the more nuanced
secondary signalling deriving from a sandbox’s constituent parameters
(comprising matters such as eligibility criteria, duration, supports, regulatory relief and reporting requirements). Thus, the FinTech-friendly signal
being broadcast to FinTech innovators may be stronger in some jurisdictions
and dimmer or absent in others.
In examining secondary signalling, overall consideration of the design
choices made by the sandbox regulator should enable a view to be formed
in relation to the general regulatory approach being adopted, including
whether it is well-defined, objective and transparent and whether the overall
approach is facilitatory or even lax, having regard to the protections available
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Commission, ‘Regulatory sandbox: Licence exemption users’ (2019) <https://asic.gov.au/
for-business/innovation-hub/fintech-regulatory-sandbox/regulatory-sandbox-licence-exemption-users/> accessed 2 November 2019.
In Australia, for example, when poor levels of industry interest became evident, there was a
strong backlash against the restrictive design of the regulatory sandbox and (as referred to
earlier), root and branch legislative reform is consequently underway to make the exemption
framework accessible to a greater range of financial products and services. See, ‘FinTech
Australia Supports Proposed Sandbox Expansion and Calls for Further Improvements’
(FinTech Australia, 15 March 2018) <https://fintechaustralia.org.au/fintech-australia-supports-proposed-sandbox-expansion-and-calls-for-further-improvements/> accessed 2
November 2019.
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to consumers and the equivalent treatment of competitors outside the sandbox. Furthermore, by the same means, inter-country comparisons of regulatory sandboxes (and overall regulatory structures) should be capable of being
formed by the business and legal community and scholars. However, at this
point in the evolution of the regulatory sandbox, a few short years after the
UK led the field in establishing the first sandbox in 2016, it is challenging
to comprehensively compare different sandbox regimes.61 In the absence of
a supranational guiding framework for regulatory sandboxes, use of terminology, wider legal frameworks and regulatory approaches and design vary
considerably. National regulators have adapted and innovated in devising
their own brand of regulatory sandbox. This restricts observational generalisations when discussing the regulatory sandbox concept.62 In design,
FinTech regulatory sandboxes cover a wide range of activities, traversing
banking, investment activities and services as well as insurance and compliance products. In some countries, a selective or restricted approach to
eligible candidates and types of projects admitted has been employed. For
example, in India, the RBI’s sandbox was initially designed to be specifically confined to start-ups but in response to feedback this was broadened
out in the final version. Hong Kong’s sandbox is restricted to incumbent
banks (and partnering technology firms). Its FinTech Supervisory Sandbox
launched in 2016 is specifically intended to enable banks to engage in pilot
tests of FinTech initiatives such as biometric authentication.63 Reflecting its
heritage in banking, Switzerland has a regulatory sandbox solely for projects
involved in banking.64

IV. Does

R egulatory Sandbox Compromise
A ppropriate R egulation?

the

In defining eligibility controls to restrict access to regulatory sandboxes, jurisdictions are learning through trial and error what fits best in their regulatory
and commercial landscape. As such, regulators are finding their regulatory
comfort zone and broadcasting it to the market in the form of agreed parameters for regulatory sandboxes. Not all opportunities are regarded equally.
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Ringe and Ruof (n 38) 44 (noting the difficulty of comparing the efficacy of different regulatory sandbox models while they are in their infancy).
Given the different models of sandbox that have evolved, the term ‘regulatory sandbox’ as
employed in this paper, is neutral as to whether the firms admitted are regulated or unregulated and whether any regulatory relief applies to them.
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Fintech Supervisory Sandbox 2.0 (2020) <https://www.
hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech-supervisory-sandbox.shtml> accessed 2 November 2019.
In 2018, proposals were made that would extend the Swiss sandbox to include the development of products based on blockchain.
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The State of Arizona, motivated by risk minimisation, specifically excludes
securities trading, insurance products, or services that provide solely deposit-taking functions from eligibility to enter the FinTech Sandbox.65 There
is a concern that some finance centres with light touch regulatory environments that are keen to position themselves as FinTech-friendly may prioritise
innovation over putting adequate safeguards in place to protect the public
interest.66 Cryptocurrencies are a case in point. For some observers, the willingness of certain regulators to allow cryptocurrency actors to experiment in
the sandbox has raised alarm bells. Many jurisdictions have steered clear no
doubt due in part to concerns about the insufficiency of investor protection
as well as the uncertainty of regulatory approach.67 For example, the RBI’s
indicative black list shows caution in excluding cryptocurrency/crypto asset
services and ICOs from sandbox participation.68 Such judgment calls are
particularly complex in relation to emerging technologies and dovetail to
a wider frame of how the relevant sandbox operates. As such, it would be
facile to label such regulatory choices as inherently right or wrong in their
own right. There is nonetheless a concern that facilitating market access via
the establishment of a regulatory sandbox could cut across well-established
objectives of financial regulation and in doing so, permit harm to investors and consumers.69 Problematically, there is a dearth of publicly available
information, both as to the exercise of regulatory discretion, and in relation
to sandbox outcomes in practice.
In Singapore, a recognised regional financial centre with a light-touch regulatory environment, the Central Bank has been focused on trialling ICOs
and facilitating ownership of cryptocurrencies using a regulatory sandbox
rather than banning them outright as some countries have done amid investor protection fears.70 In the UK, a number of cryptocurrency companies
have been admitted to the FCA sandbox. Within a controlled environment,
it hopes to be able to distinguish good ICOs and cryptocurrencies from poor
65
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Arizona Attorney General, ‘FinTech – FAQs’ (2018) <https://www.azag.gov/fintech/faq>
accessed 2 November 2019.
See generally, Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘A Rational Regulatory Strategy for Governing Financial
Innovation’ (2017) 8 European Journal of Risk Regulation 743 (arguing that there has been
insufficient regulatory focus on governing financial innovation).
For a good discussion of the issues, see, Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘Decoupling Tokens from Trading:
Reaching Beyond Investment Regulation for Regulatory Policy in Initial Coin Offerings’
(2018) 3 International Business Law Journal 265; Chiu (n 6).
Reserve Bank of India (n 28) para 6.3.
Weber and Baisch (n 6).
HE Benedetti and L Kostovetsky, ‘Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors in Initial Coin
Offerings’ (2018) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182169> accessed 2 November 2019; DA
Zetzsche and others, ‘The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge
for Regulators’ (2019) 63(2) Harvard International Law Journal 267.
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ones. However, a crucial observation is that participation in an ICO that
has come about via a sandbox may lack appropriate regulatory protection
for disgruntled investors. There are valid concerns to be ironed out given
that crypto-assets such as Bitcoin are frequently used to facilitate criminal
activity and also expose inexperienced retail investors to considerable risk.71
This illustrates the regulatory dilemmas that exist surrounding satisfactory
reconciliation of a pro-innovation stance with a risk protection imperative
when administering a regulatory sandbox.
A further issue arises in relation to how thoroughly sandbox applications are vetted for fitness and probity. Notably, competitive rivalry between
sandboxes within a broader FinTech competition agenda is driving a trend
towards both the type of information assessed at the application stage being
watered down, and decisions being made and communicated in a relatively
short pre-determined time, rather than based on an objective, substantive
assessment by the regulator which leaves it suitably informed and ready to
make its decision. As competition for a slice of the FinTech pie has heated
up, a number of jurisdictions have sought to give their sandbox an enhanced
competitive edge by introducing expedited decision-making with a view to
enabling innovative products to come to market more quickly. An expedited application process reduces the burden on firms in relation to the time
and financial resources committed to the application process. Malaysia
and Singapore have come to the fore in this respect. The Central Bank of
Malaysia is expected to reach a decision on applications within a remarkably
quick time of 15 working days.72 Singapore’s Sandbox Express provides a 21
day model for insurance broking, recognised market operators and remittance businesses.73 Applications for the Sandbox Express are truncated and
considered based on an evaluation of the technological innovativeness of the
relevant product or service and on a fitness and propriety assessment with a
view to fast-tracking decisions. In India, a four week time to decision is on
the table.74 It is too early to say whether these developments will have a deleterious effect in individual cases, but with truncated decision-making, there
71
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A fuller consideration of investor protection issues is outside the scope of this paper.
Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Technology Regulatory Sandbox Framework (2016)
<www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=57&pg=137&ac=533&bb=file> accessed 2 November
2019.
Monetary Authority of Singapore, ‘MAS Launches Sandbox Express for Faster Market
Testing of Innovative Financial Services’ (Media Release, 2019) <https://www.mas.gov.sg/
news/media-releases/2019/mas-launches-sandbox-express-for-faster-market-testing-of-innovative-financial-services> accessed 2 November 2019.
Reserve Bank of India (n 28) para 7.2.1. This, however, relates to preliminary screening.
A further three-week assessment period is provided for, following a four-week test design
phase.
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certainly seems to be potential for inadequate risk-assessment with consequent adverse implications for the public good during testing and beyond.75

A.  Disclosures
Disclosures perform an important function in drawing consumers’ attention
to risk. Most sandboxes have specific rules in relation to informing potential
consumers in relation to the restricted nature of the sandbox. Customers of
sandbox participants are notified of the potential risks of participating in the
testing and are obliged to give their informed consent indicating that they
understand and accept the risks.76 There may also be a requirement to make
consumers aware of available redress mechanisms. In jurisdictions where
consumer protection is restricted during the sandbox period, as compared to
on the open market, consumers must be duly notified of such restriction.77
Until the regulatory sandbox, as a regulatory innovation, matures and is
subject to empirical study, it is difficult to fathom the effectiveness of disclosures in influencing the market behaviour of prospective sandbox consumers
and investors. The potential cautionary effects of such disclosures may be
counteracted by press releases from regulators trumpeting the admission of
the latest participants to their sandbox, thus lending an air of credibility
to proceedings that may cause market actors to unduly relax their guard.
This shows the delicate tightrope that FinTech regulators must walk as they
negotiate promoting innovation with micro-prudential and macro-prudential objectives.

B.  Risk Mitigation
Small-scale testing over a defined period of time within a sandbox helps
to minimise consumer risk. Nonetheless, one of the most important design
aspects of the testing environment provided by any regulatory sandbox is
the nature of the controls provided concerning how risk is mapped and contained. It is common for a bespoke framework of protections to be agreed
upon by regulators with each sandbox participant, tailored to the nature of
the testing activity. Regulators face a multi-faceted challenge in designing
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In Singapore, for applications that are complex and require more time to assess, the MAS
may decide not to consider the application under the Sandbox Express and instead assess it
under the customised sandbox approach.
See, for example, Reserve Bank of India (n 28) para 6.8.2.
In some regulatory sandboxes, consumers can expect to enjoy the same consumer protection and enforcement rights as consumers outside the sandbox in that jurisdiction. Thus, in
the UK, consumers in appropriate cases may have recourse to the Financial Ombudsman
Services and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. In other schemes such as the
Australian FinTech Licensing Exemption, the protection available to sandbox consumers is
truncated.
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appropriate investor, consumer and systemic protections, based on anticipating a range of actor responses to a given stimulus.78 This challenge is multiplied several-fold in the case of FinTech innovation as it involves wading
through relatively uncharted waters. The point has been reinforced by the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor:
New products and services that are tested in a sandbox may present
additional risks that may be hard to assess before the service/product
is fully launched in the market. These risks may include those stemming from features of the innovation and/or limited regulatory and
supervisory capacity (e.g., poorly designed regulatory requirements,
whether too light or too burdensome; inadequate supervisory tools
necessary for collecting and analyzing the data generated).79

In the UK, assignment of a dedicated case officer to sandbox participants
helps to support the successful design and operation of the test as well as the
navigation of the regulatory framework. Close contact with an FCA case
officer is designed to ensure that the business model fits within the regulatory framework and that necessary safeguards are built in.80 Such mode of
continuing discussion, and where appropriate, recalibration, is useful. This
model is also on the cards for the RBI’s sandbox which counts on the oversight of its FinTech Unit under the guidance of an Inter Departmental Group,
benefiting from domain experts.81 By contrast, stock protections can be built
into a FinTech block exemption model that does not require an individual
application and approval process. In Australia, a number of safeguards are
built in by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’)
to the FinTech licensing exemption through the imposition of pre-conditions
such as consumer protection measures, client and exposure limits, dispute
resolution and compensation arrangements. In relation to testing robo-advice products, consumer detriment can be mitigated against by ensuring that
the advice generated is audited by appropriately qualified staff provided by
the regulator.82 This solution is of clear benefit to both the sandbox participant and clients. This approach was taken in the UK by the FCA for firms
using its sandbox to test robo-advice products.83 Such safeguards can thus
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See further, N Moloney, ‘Regulating the Retail Markets’ in Moloney, Ferran and Payne (n
2).
Jenik and Lauer (n 26) 6.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) para 2.14.
Reserve Bank of India (n 28) para 7.1.
This is done through qualified financial advisers checking the automated advice provided
based on programmed algorithms.
Financial Conduct Authority (n 16) para 4.42.
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mitigate the risk of unsuitable or incorrect advice being provided both while
live testing is occurring and thereafter.
It bears mentioning that since the global financial crisis, policy-makers
have moved from a conception of the financial citizen as empowered to a
more protective stance in relation to consumers as in need of fair treatment.84
In the domain of new FinTech products and services, investors of varying
hues are at risk of falling for hype and not being suitably informed as to
what could go wrong and the consequences therein. Appropriate types of
consumer protection measures for sandbox testing will vary depending on
factors such as the business model and the nature of technology employed.
Restrictions of scale are likely to be imposed in order to contain risk, both
for individual consumers and to avoid risks that would impact on financial stability more generally. Along with capital limits, restrictions may be
imposed on the number of consumers85 and on the frequency of transactions.
Where relevant, it is common to impose quantifiable restrictions in the form
of maximum transaction values and cash holding limits. In some cases, customers may be restricted to a certain profile or market segment better placed
to absorb the potential risk. Furthermore, measures to shore up data privacy
and cybersecurity are key matters of concern.86
A consumer redress mechanism may be tailored, including specification of
the availability of financial compensation to customers in the testing period
in specified circumstances. Sandbox participants must generally demonstrate
that they have the resources to be able to compensate customers in the event
of any loss suffered during testing. Reflecting this, for sandbox participants
trialling the use of digital currencies in money remittance underpinned by
DLT, a safeguard built in by the UK’s FCA requires participants to guarantee
any funds lost in the transmission process.87 This underpins the importance
of reliable and efficient payment mechanisms. The Indian RBI sandbox
framework opts instead for an insurance requirement to cover losses.88
The biggest issue in judging whether a regulatory sandbox compromises appropriate regulation relates to the matter of regulatory reliefs being
afforded to participants, and it is to this question that we now turn.
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Responsive regulation needs to be responsible. Public gatekeeper functions
and regulatory controls should not take a back seat in the race to attract
FinTech start-ups. This dilemma has parallels with the debate on the market for corporate incorporations, with the race for pre-eminence in the
United States being won hands down by Delaware for its pro-management
corporate law framework.89 Like the market for incorporations, regulatory
fragmentation enables competition among regulatory sandbox regimes.
Jurisdictions vary in terms of the sectoral regulator’s power to relax or waive
regulatory requirements for sandbox users. Weber and Baisch caution that
“watering down and softening proven regulatory concepts should not be
done recklessly.”90 Indeed, some jurisdictions have come out firmly against
regulatory sandboxes in so far as they embody regulatory dilution. The role
of expanding competition suggests a public interest mandate in promoting
consumer choice, price and efficiency. This is a completely different driver
than a risk-reduction regulatory model which typically stems from a regulatory focus on mitigating the potential for systemic harm and harm to
the consumer. In the zeal to embrace FinTech, a legitimate and unavoidable
question concerns how easily these two mandates can be reconciled. These
divergent drivers create the potential for regulatory friction. Clearly, a competition promotion mandate should not come at the expense of appropriate
investor protection and concern for market stability.91 It has been contended
that while a race to the bottom is a concern, this is outweighed by the “dire
need of more competition” in financial services markets.92 Within oppor89
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K Greenfield, ‘Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law’ (2004) 67(4)
Law and Contemporary Problems 105; F Stevelman, ‘Regulatory Competition, Choice
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Corporate Law 57. In a European context, see, C Kirchner, RW Painter and Wulf Kaal,
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Product for Europe’ (2005) 2 European Company and Financial Law Review 159; D
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EU Private Company Law Reform, Some Critical Reflections on Regulatory Approach’
in AJ Viera Gonzalez and C Teichmann (eds), Private Companies in Europe: the Societas
Personae (SUP) and the Recent Developments in the EU Member States (Thomson Reuters
Aranzadi 2016) 55.
Weber and Baisch (n 6) 337.
Competition and potentially, financial stability challenges are posed by TechFins (large
technology companies (the acronym ‘GAFA’ is used to refer to Google, Apple, Facebook,
and Amazon) entering the FinTech space. For a discussion of the issues and the case for a
potential monitoring role for RegTech, see, DW Arner, J Barberis and RP Buckley, ‘FinTech,
RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation’ (2017) 33 Northwestern
Journal of International Law and Business 371; RP Buckley and others (n 86).
Buckley and others (n 13) 21.
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tunity-based regulation, a robust regulatory approach should, however, dictate that where such a dilemma presents itself, risk minimisation must be
prioritised. In the UK, a statutory cue is provided that in the event of a
clash, consumer protection and market integrity trump promoting effective
competition.93
Within the EU, both Germany and France have exhibited robust anti-sandbox sentiment and are not in favour of providing regulatory sandboxes, with
BaFin, the German regulator, said to be against providing ‘little buckets and
spades’.94 These regulators are sending a distinct message – that FinTech
should not be afforded special treatment and that risk protection is the paramount concern of the regulator. Within the regulatory culture that prevails
in Germany, the FinTech industry itself is also keen to avoid the reputational
damage which admission to a special regulatory environment might yield.95
Notably, no dual competition mandate exists in Germany. The solution here
for inexperienced firms is to find a licensed co-operation partner to provide
a stepping stone before going it alone to seek regulatory authorisation. There
has also been strong opposition in the United States to the possibility that
legislative reforms might involve regulatory requirements being waived for
FinTech.96
Jurisdictions vary in terms of the latitude afforded to the regulator to
relax or waive regulatory requirements for sandbox participants. While providing regulatory relief to participants divides opinions, it is in essence an
agile regulatory adaptation to harsh or unwieldy regulatory topography. As
the United States Treasury Department puts it, “[a] regulatory environment
with largely binary outcomes — either approval or disapproval — may
lack appropriate flexibility for dealing with innovations.”97 A hierarchy
or sliding scale of models of regulatory relief observed in different regulatory
sandbox systems that have emerged to date is presented below. Four primary models characterising an observed continuum of national regulatory
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approaches to sandboxes are evident, each sending different signals to
would-be participants.

A.  No Relaxation of Applicable Rules
The first category of regulatory sandbox predicates that no relaxation of rules
is available to sandbox users. It evinces a strict letter of the law approach.
Participants are subject to applicable legislation at all times. This has the
consequence that participants in the sandbox do not receive more favourable
treatment than those outside it in relation to the applicability of relevant
rules. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority’s regulatory sandbox,
FTLab, which opened in 2018, provides an example of this approach. Not
permitting a relaxation of the rules during the sandbox test period helps
to meet concerns in relation to equality of access. What marks this type of
sandbox out from forms of informal FinTech supports such as innovation
hubs is that the assistance provided to chosen participants is more formalised
and concentrated.

B.  Relaxation of Applicable Rules Permitted Only
Within the Discretionary Scope of Existing Rules
The second category is a variant on the first and occurs where there is an
inbuilt discretion in the relevant regulatory rules to relax their application,
with the sandbox operating within this framework. This model has particular potential within the EU where national regulatory authorities are
required to apply relevant EU financial services legislation but are permitted
to work within any in-built flexibility in these instruments in relation to their
application to FinTech. EU financial services law enshrines a principle of
proportionality whereby regulatory and supervisory requirements are to be
applied having regard to matters such as the size and risk profile of the firm
concerned as well as the nature and complexity of the risks inherent in the
business model.98 The EU’s FinTech Action Plan expressly tips off Member
States in relation to this possibility:
National competent authorities must apply relevant EU financial services legislation. However, these rules include a margin of discretion
with regard to the application of the proportionality and flexibility
principles embedded in these rules. This can be particularly useful in
the context of technological innovation.99
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To date, the UK’s FCA has followed this approach in applying the EU
financial services rulebook.100 For the FCA sandbox, most firms are required
to have a restricted authorisation in order to enter the test environment. This
ensures that the firm has the requisite competence and financial wherewithal
needed to carry on the relevant business with an appropriate degree of consumer and investor protection. However, sandbox tools provided by the FCA
potentially include rule waivers and no-enforcement action letters (comfort
letters). That said, despite signalling the potential for rule waivers in individual cases, anecdotal evidence suggests that to date, the FCA has not relaxed
actual regulatory requirements for any sandbox user. The Norwegian regulatory sandbox for the FinTech industry, created by the Financial Supervisory
Authority of Norway meets this model, with the supervisory authority having the power to suspend certain requirements based on the principle of proportionality to the extent permitted by the regulatory regime.101

C.  Block Exemption Licence
While application to a general regulatory sandbox may result in the creation of a customised sandbox, a block exemption licence model would not.
A block exemption approach is intended to provide a pre-defined sandbox
with pre-determined parameters including in relation to available regulatory
reliefs. Using a block exemption approach signals to FinTech innovators that
they can opt-in based on an autonomous determination of eligibility by the
regulatory actor.
This model is evident in Australia, Switzerland and Singapore. In
Australia, ASIC has exercised its statutory relief powers to provide a FinTech
licensing exemption for a period of up to 12 months, free from the need to
have an Australian financial services or credit licence.102 ASIC uses a white
list approach such that firms can satisfy themselves that they come within
criteria for validation testing and notify ASIC of intention to test without
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any requirement that ASIC issue an approval.103 A number of safeguards
are built in through the imposition of pre-conditions such as consumer protection measures, client and exposure limits, dispute resolution and compensation arrangements. There is no exemption from other laws such as
anti-money laundering or tax laws. Switzerland’s regulatory sandbox, introduced in 2017 for projects in banking, involves a licence-free innovation
area or sandbox by means of an amendment to the Banking Ordinance.104
Crucially, this means that FinTech companies carrying out relevant activities
can test without a banking licence. In 2019, Singapore introduced a fasttrack sandbox (to complement its pre-existing general regulatory sandbox)
named the Sandbox Express, built on a block exemption approach.105 The
objective is to enable certain lower risk and well-understood activities to
enter the experimentation phase and test more quickly by providing pre-defined sandboxes to cover insurance broking, recognised market operators
and remittance businesses.106

D.  Tailor-Made Sandbox Based on Relaxation of
Specific Rules
The most radical category of sandbox is the tailor-made sandbox whereby
discretionary relaxation of rules for individual sandbox users is permitted
and no such flexibility is provided to entities outside the sandbox. The tailor-made sandbox model permits relaxation of rules on a case by case basis
to create an individualised sandbox for FinTech entrepreneurs. This is a
regulatory trump card for countries positioning themselves as key FinTech
centres and signalling their willingness to facilitate new business models.
Opportunity-based regulation involving relaxation of the regulatory framework is clearly considered justifiable by these regulators in helping to get
nascent FinTech innovation out of the traps. However, care needs to be taken
that due attention is paid to risks as well as opportunities in making that
compromise.
In contemplating a relaxation of otherwise applicable rules, this model
of regulatory sandbox goes counter-clockwise to the trend of post-global
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financial crisis regulation where the regulatory landscape for financial services has seen accretions of more regulation rather than less. In a sandbox
design allowing regulatory requirements to be relaxed for participants, there
is an obvious concern that this may compromise consumer protection. That
said, such relief is generally ring-fenced – where regulatory requirements are
relaxed for entities admitted to the sandbox, this is usually confined to the
sandbox testing period. Unless the jurisdiction allows for a tailored regulatory regime to be negotiated upon sandbox exit, entities will need to obtain
the requisite regulatory approvals generally applicable outside of the sandbox. Although it is early days and regulators are still dipping their toes in the
waters of regulatory flexibility, it bears pointing out that a lack of transparency in relation to how far rules may be bent is problematic. For instance,
Malaysia’s National Regulatory Sandbox Initiative somewhat opaquely contemplates ‘regulatory flexibilities’ being afforded.107
Jurisdictions where tailored regulatory relaxation is permitted include the
State of Arizona (United States), Brunei, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore. The approach taken by Malaysia as a competitive
regulatory strategy was elaborated upon by a policy insider as follows:
With the Sandbox, we are willing to “flex” rules and regulations to
enable testing where we deem that the solution contains strong value
proposition and the risks can be appropriately contained. This will
also allow us to reduce time to market for new innovative products,
which under normal process, might get stifled by regulatory hurdles.
It enables us to ensure that our regulatory framework is relevant and
responsive to innovations that can bring game changing outcomes to
our financial services sector.108

Rather than a consensus approach emerging, each regulator has
approached regulatory relaxation in its own way. The Hong Kong Monetary
Authority has the power to relax supervisory requirements for incumbent
banks admitted to its FinTech Supervisory Sandbox launched in 2016 to
enable banks to engage in pilot tests of FinTech initiatives such as biometric
authentication.109 In Singapore, the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s regu107
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latory sandbox permits the creation of a customised sandbox for participants
whereby certain legal and regulatory requirements may be relaxed for an
entity for the duration of the sandbox.110 Examples of these are provided
in the relevant sandbox guidelines and include financial requirements such
as capital adequacy requirements, as well as matters relating to management experience and existing track record.111 In India, the RBI Sandbox contemplates relaxation of regulatory requirements on a case by case basis for
the duration of the sandbox112 and the framework provides examples in the
form of matters including track record, liquidity requirements and financial
soundness.113 Such flexibility does not extend to KYC requirements, antimoney laundering requirements, counter-financing of terrorism measures
and other statutory restrictions.
The Canadian Securities Administrators (‘the CSA’) also plays a role in
tailoring bespoke exceptions to securities laws.114 In Canada, discussion
may first occur with the local securities regulator on a case by case basis
in relation to the relevant business model and the application of securities
laws before submission of an application to the CSA. The CSA will determine the tailored terms and conditions for individual sandbox participation. For example, in 2017, Token Funder Inc. was admitted to the CSA
Regulatory Sandbox with a view to launching an initial token offering by
means of a private placement and was granted relief from the dealer registration requirement while in the sandbox. However, conditions including KYC
requirements were imposed.115 Somewhat controversially, Québec’s financial regulator, Autorité des Marches Financiérs (‘AMF’), provided Impak
Finance, an ICO platform for investing in socially responsible enterprises,
with relief from securities regulation requirements concerning not only registration as a securities dealer, but also the provision of a prospectus to investors.116 These are usually considered standard investor protection measures.
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Patrick Theoret of AMF reasoned that “[i]t’s in the spirit of the sandbox that
we are willing to alleviate some of the requirements on … a test case basis.
It’s a test run to see whether there are investor protection [issues] with the
relief that we grant.”117 This highlights the role of the sandbox as a contained
mutual learning experience.
Open-ended regulatory flexibility permits adaptability and regulatory
dialogue. However, any associated lack of certainty in relation to determining the baseline of the regulatory perimeter is absolutely undesirable,
not just as a matter of commercial certainty, but more fundamentally, in
terms of the need for a core policy determination of where the regulatory bar
should be set. Therefore, although the flexibility of the regulatory sandbox
is its strength in relation to promoting competition, it may also prove to be
its Achilles’ heel. While promoting innovation and competition in Fintech
markets, regulators need to remember that they are public gatekeepers.
Regulatory dialogue is one thing. There needs, however, to be firm limits
as to the extent of regulatory flexibility. All market participants ought to
be treated equally and fundamental sound principles of financial regulation should not be watered down on a whim even for a time-limited period.
Reflecting such concerns, for some, the regulatory sandbox is simply wrongheaded and a tailor-made sandbox, a non sequitur. Perhaps the real work
can be just as well done by the unsung hero – the innovation hub.118 It would
be wrong to assume that the relatively small number of regulatory sandbox
schemes in existence across the globe to date is simply attributable to many
regulators lagging behind early adopters. In some countries, regulators are
privately unconvinced that a regulatory sandbox is an appropriate part of the
toolbox of a regulator in their distinct regulatory landscape and regulatory
culture. These concerns ought to be weighed in the balance in inter-regulator and stakeholder dialogue on the regulatory sandbox, and the future of
FinTech regulation and innovation facilitation.

VI. Conclusion
Transformative technological change is ongoing and regulators are keenly
aware of their contribution to facilitating FinTech competition and innovation. Market innovation is forcing regulatory innovation; iterative, agile
experimentation and new regulatory strategies. The regulatory sandbox construct, characterised here as opportunity-based regulation, is best understood
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contextually within, if not a regulatory vacuum, a slowly evolving regulatory
topography that does not yet meet the specific needs of FinTech markets. A
compromise blend of ‘softly, softly’ and ‘wait and see’ regulatory stances is
accordingly evident in the roll-out of the regulatory sandbox as a two-way
learning tool for the regulator and the regulatory actor. Significantly, not
only is the regulatory sandbox an experimental phase for firms testing innovative products and services, it is also a novel regulatory experiment as far as
regulators are concerned as they use the sandbox to actively learn about new
technologies and products and how regulation needs to adapt and respond.
While sandboxes perform a valuable gap-filling role, they are not a regulatory panacea for FinTech. Financial innovation is complex, involving technological innovation and disruptive new business models, and presents both
benefits and risks. Proportionate regulation is the answer but understanding
and devising what is needed will take a considered response. As one regulatory insider astutely puts it, “Regulation must not front-run innovation.
Introducing regulation prematurely may stifle innovation and potentially
derail the adoption of useful technology.”119 The proliferation of the regulatory sandbox phenomenon is indicative of a willingness among regulators
to boost the FinTech economic bounce with an adaptive regulatory stopgap
for the brightest FinTech innovators. The broader coherence and competition
challenges for FinTech, posed by global regulatory fragmentation, will continue. In the meantime, there is considerable potential for calculated forum
shopping by mobile FinTech entrepreneurs as they work out what opportunities are offered by available regulatory sandboxes.
In forging ahead with a competition promotion agenda, regulators need
to be sensitive to the ripple effects of a regulatory sandbox on barriers to
entry and natural selection in the market. The tailor-made regulatory sandbox model evident in some jurisdictions heralds bespoke regulation for a
sandbox in-group, thus creating a multi-tiered regulatory framework. This is
a remarkable development. As we tread a careful path from the global financial crisis, care must be taken not to compromise appropriate regulation. A
fundamental regulatory issue for each jurisdiction to confront concerns the
justifiability of granting full or partial waiver of core regulatory requirements to sandbox participants, even for a time-limited period.
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